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Abstract. We report on a deficiency in the specifications of the Authen-
tication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocols of the Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS) and Long-Term Evolution (LTE)
as well as the specification of the GSM Subscriber Identity Authenti-
cation protocol, which are all maintained by the 3rd Generation Part-
nership Program (3GPP), an international consortium of telecommuni-
cations standards bodies. The flaw, although found using the computa-
tional prover CryptoVerif, is of symbolic nature and can be exploited by
both an outside and an inside attacker in order to violate entity authen-
tication properties. An inside attacker may impersonate an honest user
during a run of the protocol and apply the session key to use subsequent
wireless services on behalf of the honest user.
Keywords: Applied Cryptography, Vulnerability Assessment, Security Proto-
cols, Authentication, Mobile Network Security, LTE, UMTS
1 Introduction
These are exciting times in the development of mobile networks. The Global
System for Mobile communication (GSM) and UMTS mobile networks are a
worldwide success with now about 6 billion supscriptions [16], and still grow-
ing. New mobile systems are rolled out, including the 3GPP recent develop-
ments named ’Long Term Evolution’ (LTE) and ’System Architecture Evolution’
(SAE), which have become a forerunner for the fourth generation (4G) gener-
ation mobile communication system. The new system is called ’Evolved Packet
System (EPS), emphasizing the all-IP packet switching design throughout the
system onto the user’s mobile terminal. 1 As more and more people take advan-
tage of the accelerated internet access through their mobile phones, the recent
international concern about securing the cyberspace and critical infrastructures
certainly must include mobile networks. There is a multitude of security issues in
such large networked systems. Here we will focus on the mobile terminal access
security by means of an authentication and key agreement protocol. Weaknesses
1 Although EPS is the proper technical term for this new 3GPP mobile system gen-
eration of SAE/LTE, we will use the most well-known name LTE.
in this protocol may not only lead to revenue loss to mobile operators but might
also facilitate cyber crime.
The LTE AKA protocol is based on the Universal Mobile Telecommuni-
cations System (UMTS) AKA protocol, which is widely used today for third
generation (3G) wireless networks, and which itself is the successor of the GSM
Subscriber Identity Authentication (SIA) protocol. With the persistent spread
of these mobile network systems, these authentication protocols have arguably
become the most widely used security protocols today. While there exist for-
mal analyses of UMTS AKA in the Symbolic Model of security (also called the
Dolev-Yao model and inspired by [14]), this is in fact the first analysis of LTE
AKA to date.
We report on a preliminary result of an ongoing analysis [18] of UMTS AKA
and LTE AKA with the tool CryptoVerif [13] that can prove the security of
protocols directly in the computational model. We discover a previously unde-
tected flaw in the specifications of both UMTS AKA and LTE AKA. We note
that the specifications of the GSM SIA protocol [9, 8] suffer, strictly speaking,
from the same vulnerability (cf. Section 3.3). The vulnerability can be exploited
by both outside and inside attackers in order to break authentication of a user
to a serving network. Furthermore, inside attackers may impersonate an honest
user and use wireless services on his behalf without the user being present on the
network at that time. We reported the vulnerability to the 3GPP where the issue
is currently under investigation. We have not tested current implementations for
susceptibility to these attacks (cf. Section 3.1). We propose a simple correction
to UMTS/LTE AKA and are working on CryptoVerif proofs of correspondence
(i.e. authentication) and secrecy properties for the session key.
Related Work Annex B of the 3GPP technical report in [1] documents a
formal analysis of the UMTS AKA protocol using a BAN logic variant. The
analysis verifies authentication and secrecy properties. The flaw that we present
here is not detected in [1] because strong assumptions (the prerequisites on
SN’s side) are used which already eliminate the weakness in the protocol. The
GSM SIA protocol does not provide authentication of the access network to the
user and the interoperability of the GSM and UMTS systems perpetuates this
attack possibility, reported in [17]. Our analysis is not directed to the problems of
interoperability between LTE/UMTS/GSM. A redirection attack on the UMTS
AKA is reported in [19], which exploits the observation that the user is not
able to authenticate the identity of the serving network because this is not
included in the authentication vector provided by the home network. The new
LTE AKA specification is designed to fix this weakness. A recent paper focuses
on the privacy properties of the UMTS AKA protocol [10]. They use the tool
ProVerif [11] for a formal analysis, and the paper describes an attack that enables
the adversary to track a user. This is done by exploiting different error messages
that are returned by UMTS AKA. The analysis models the UMTS AKA as a
simplified two-party protocol between a user and the core network. However, by
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reducing UMTS AKA to a two-party protocol, the weakness uncovered in the
present work is concealed.
Structure of this work In Section 2, we will give an overview of the Mobile
Network architecture and give a description of the UMTS AKA and LTE AKA
protocols. In Section 3, we describe the flaw we found in the specifications of
UMTS and LTE AKA and its consequences, where we discuss the relevance of
the flaw for GSM SIA in Section 3.3. We conclude in Section 4.
2 UMTS and LTE Authentication and Key Agreement
2.1 Overview of the Mobile Network Architecture
For both UMTS and LTE the basic network architectures are very similar. In
comparison to UMTS, the network elements used for LTE are upgraded and
mostly renamed. However, they fulfill the analogous tasks in both cases. In or-
der to avoid unnecessary confusion over terminology, we give a unified description
of the network architectures of UMTS and LTE at the level of detail necessary
for understanding our analysis and the vulnerability presented below. Basically,
the mobile network architecture comprises three parts, that is, the user’s mobile
equipment U , the Radio Access Network (RAN), and the Core Network (CN).
The user equipment consists of the mobile equipment and a tamper-resistant chip
card, the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). The USIM is issued by
a mobile operator to a subscriber and contains the International Mobile Sub-
scriber Identity (IMSI), the permanent key of the subscription shared between
subscriber and operator, and the cryptographic algorithms for the authentica-
tion protocol. In the following, we will use the terms user, subscriber and user
equipment interchangeably. Each mobile operator runs an Authentication Center
(AuC ) server within its core network that contains the security related infor-
mation of all the subscribers of the operator and generates temporary security
credentials to be used by a user and a core network to establish authentication
guarantees and set up session keys. The core network is divided into a serving
network S and a home network H, where the latter contains and maintains the
AuC and the serving network is responsible for the communication to the user
equipment through the radio access network.
The serving network and the home network do not necessarily belong to the
same security domain, i.e. they may be controlled by different mobile operators.
A subscriber U1 of a mobile operator OP1 with home network H1 may roam
into the domain of mobile operator OP2’s radio access network maintained by
serving network S2. If OP1 has a roaming agreement with OP2, then U1 will
be able to access the mobile network through S2’s radio access network. In this
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Fig. 1. The UMTS/LTE Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol. The session key
in UMTS is Skey ← CK ‖IK , and in LTE it is Skey := KASME ← KDF (SQNH ‖CK ‖
IK ‖SNid).
2.2 The UMTS & LTE AKA Protocols
Figure 1 shows the message sequence diagram description of the authentication
and key agreement protocol in a unified way for UMTS and LTE on a similar
level of detail as depicted in [3, 7]. The protocol is executed between user U , vis-
ited serving network S and U ’s home network H. U and H share the long-term
key K0 and a set of algorithms f1, . . . , f4 and, in the case of LTE, also a key
derivation function KDF . The functions f1, f2 are so called message authentica-
tion functions, and f3, f4 are so called key generating functions
2. Moreover, U
maintains a counter SQN U and H a counter SQNH for U .
A protocol run starts with S sending a user id request and U responding
with its IMSI 3. Next follows the authentication data transfer, in which S sends
an authentication data request to H, that consists of U ’s IMSI and S’s iden-
tifier SNid , and H answers with an authentication data response. H chooses a
2 We choose to do without the anonymity key, i.e. f5 ≡ 0, which is an option in the
specifications. We also omit the AMF constant.
3 In fact, U may alternatively respond with a temporary mobile subscriber identity
(TMSI), which reduces but does not fully avoid the use of the IMSI .
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fresh nonce RAND and computes, with the key K0 and its sequence number
SQNH , the so-called message authentication code MAC , the expected response
XRES , the cipher key CK , the integrity key IK , and the authentication token
AUTN as depicted in Figure 1, where ‖ denotes concatenation. The main differ-
ence between the UMTS AKA and LTE AKA is the session key Skey . In LTE
AKA, the session key is computed over the identifier of S (cf. caption of Fig-
ure 1). There is also the option that H sends S multiple authentication vectors
(RAND i,AUTN i,XRES i,Skey i) for i = 1, . . . , n at once in order to reduce the
traffic between S and H but we will not focus on the use of this option.
In the user authentication request, S forwards only RAND and AUTN to
U . From the received RAND , AUTN , the user U extracts SQNH , computes the
expected message authentication code XMAC and compares it to MAC contained
in AUTN . If they are equal then U performs a check on the sequence numbers
SQNH and SQN U
4. If either of this two checks fail, then U sends some error
messages to S (in fact, the error messages may be different, therefore allowing the
linkability attack of [10]). Otherwise U computes the response RES and sends
it to S. Finally, S compares the response received from U with the expected
response received from H; if they are equal then the UMTS/LTE AKA run was
successfully completed.
Intuitively, the UMTS/LTE AKA establishes the session key Skey between
U and S, therefore, Skey must satisfy some secrecy property. Furthermore, the
protocol aims to authenticate U to S. Both properties require S to trust H to
provide a correct authentication data response. The sequence numbers allow to
detect possible replays of authentication tokens. The UMTS/LTE AKA protocol,
as depicted in Figure 1, does not offer authentication of S to U . This known
weakness has been described in [19]. User U may at most know that H generated
the received nonce and authentication token for some service network.
Following the UMTS/LTE AKA, serving network S and user U need to nego-
tiate the cryptographic algorithms (security mode) used to protect subsequent
wireless communication between S and U . Note that these algorithms are, in
particular for inter-domain connections, not pre-determined. The messages of
this negotiation are protected by (keys derived from) Skey . This is especially
relevant for the case of LTE, where Skey is generated over S’s identifier SNid . In
LTE, by receiving the NAS security mode command directly following the user
authentication response, U should be able to authenticate S, as this message
constitutes a key confirmation of the session key KASME . According to [7], the
NAS security mode command from S to U has following form.
S −→ U : eKSI ,UE sec capabilities, ciphering algo, integrity algo,NAS -MAC
where NAS-MAC is a message authentication code under a key derived from
KASME over the rest of the message, which consists of non-secret components.
We denote by LTE AKA+1 the LTE AKA protocol together with this NAS
security mode command message.
4 Checking and increasing the sequence numbers can be different for UMTS and LTE
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3 Attacking and Correcting UMTS & LTE AKA
Here we present a weakness found in the authentication protocol specifications
of both UMTS and LTE AKA with the help of the tool CryptoVerif [12]. Al-
though CryptoVerif has semantics in the computational model, the flaw in the
protocols is of symbolic nature. Unlike other provers that work in the symbolic
model, CryptoVerif does not output attack traces; instead we found the attack
by interpreting the last game in a sequence of game transformations performed
by CryptoVerif. It is the same flaw that is present in the specifications of both
UMTS AKA and LTE AKA. Although UMTS AKA has previously been for-
mally analyzed [10, 1], none of the previous analyses have detected this flaw.
How GSM SIA is affected by the flaw is discussed in Section 3.3.
3.1 Communication Security Between S and H
It is obvious that the communication between S and H needs to be protected in
some way, otherwise, e.g. if there is no confidentially protection, the exchanged
session key(s) are sent in the clear. The specifications of the AKA protocols in
[7] and [3] mention little about the security protection of the authentication data
transfer.
However, for UMTS and LTE, the specifications [5, 6] detail the protection of
IP-based communication between network elements. Here a distinction is made
between inter-domain communication, where standardized solutions are neces-
sary, and intra-domain communication, where the communicating parties are
controlled by the same mobile operator. For inter-domain connections over IP-
based networks, [5, 6] mandate the protection of the communication between
network elements using IPsec. For intra-domain connections over IP-based net-
works (i.e. communication over Zb interfaces), [5, 6] state that the protection
of communication is regarded as an internal issue of each domain operator. In
particular, the use of IPsec for intra-domain communication between S and H
is optional, even though the communication may involve long distance signaling.
Furthermore, in the case of UMTS, the communication between S and H
can also be carried out on the global Signaling System No. 7 network instead of
an IP-based network. The specification [4] details the protection for such com-
munication between S and H using Mobile Application Part security (MAPsec).
In comparison to IPsec, Mapsec protects messages on the application layer.
Both IPsec and MAPsec should, according to [5] and [4], offer following pro-
tection: data integrity, data origin authentication, anti-replay protection, and
confidentiality. In addition, IPsec should offer limited protection against traffic
flow analysis. Nonetheless, the attack presented below does not violate any of
these properties. We found it while assuming that the messages sent between S
and H are encrypted and then integrity protected through a message authenti-
cation code by long-term keys shared between S and H. The encrypt-then-mac
scheme is indeed the principle used in both IPsec and MAPsec.
6
3.2 Session-mixup Attack against Authentication Data Response
We consider, as usual, an adversary who is in full control of the messages sent
between instances of the roles of user U , serving network S, and home network
H. We assume that H acts as a trusted third party. When S sends an authenti-
cation data request to H for authentication parameters of U , the authentication
data response by H to S is bound to U as it includes message components that
are generated under the long-term key shared between H and U . However, S
cannot verify this (even though we assume authenticated encryption of the mes-
sages between H and S), as S does not know the key shared between the user
equipments and H. There should certainly be some mechanism for S to associate
an authentication response to the correct U if there is no attacker around. But as
such a mechanism is not specified in the AKA protocols, we do not model them
as part of the message parts that are protected by the authenticated encryption.
We present a scenario in which an inside attacker may take advantage of this
and we omit, due to space restrictions, the outside attack scenario5.
An Inside Attack In this scenario we consider an attacker A who is a sub-
scriber U of H. Say U ′ is another subscriber of H who is honest. If A knows the
IMSI ′ of U ′, which A can learn either by listening on the network or by deploy-
ing a device called imsi catcher, then A can execute the attack that is depicted
in Figure 2 without U ′ even being present. In this case, A does not need to be
able to intercept messages sent over the base stations. The attacker sends out
two user identity responses: IMSI ′ and his own subscriber identity IMSI . Then
S will run two concurrent AKA sessions, one for U and one for U ′, and sends
two authentication data requests to H. When H sends the authentication data
responses for S and U , then adversary A redirects this message such that it is
mistaken by S as the response by H for S and U ′ while he blocks the authen-
tication data response that H generated for S and U ′. Notice that this session
mixup can be created by the attacker without breaking any cryptographic primi-
tive and does generally not violate the specifications. Next the attacker redirects
the messages sent by S intended for U ′ to U . So U correctly receives the user
authentication request containing message components that were generated by
H for U (and S). Therefore, attacker A, who is registered as U , can generate
the correct response and relay it to to S such that S believes that the response
was generated by U ′. The other session that S opened for U ′ is halted by A; it
cannot be completed because A does not know the keys that U ′ shares with H.
Anyhow, A can impersonate U ′ to S. Furthermore, the attacker and S share a
session key; it was in fact generated by H for U and S. At the same time, S
believes that this session key was generated by H for S and U ′. Therefore, the
attacker is able to execute subsequent communication steps and use the derived
keys to use the wireless service provided by S on behalf of U ′. 6 S will bill H
for the service that attacker A received on U ′ behalf, and H will bill U ′.
5 which can, however, be easily derived from the inside attack.
6 The attack is not fended off by the use of TMSIs. And the attacker’s job is simplified
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Fig. 2. Message flow of an inside attack against UMTS and LTE AKA (not showing
the user id request). The attacker impersonates honest user U ′ to S and shares the
session key(s) with S, without U ′ being involved.
3.3 The GSM Subscriber Identity Authentication Protocol
The GSM SIA protocol [9, 8] is the 2G predecessor of UMTS AKA. It suffers
from the same design flaw as UMTS and LTE AKA: there is no proper binding of
the response sent by the home network (called Authentication Vector Response)
to the corresponding request. Therefore, the attack of Figure 2 could also be
deployed against GSM SIA. However, the case of GSM SIA is different. The
specifications [9, 8] are only concerned about adversaries that attack the radio
path, i.e. the connection between user equipment and base stations, while com-
pletely neglecting other connections. It does not violate the GSM specifications
if there is no protection of the authentication vector response and the session
key is transmitted in the clear by the home network. An attacker that is able
to listen on the connections within the core network does not need to resort to
the session-mixup attack to successfully violate GSM security as he can easily
obtain the session keys. However, GSM operators that would like to protect the
connection between home and serving networks, e.g. with MAPsec, need to be
extremely careful so that message parts that prevent a session-mixup attack are
sufficiently protected.
3.4 Possible Corrections
The UMTS/LTE AKA (and GSM SIA) protocols can easily be safeguarded if S is
enabled to determine, even under active attacks, for which user IMSI a response
by H was generated. We present two approaches to correcting the UMTS/LTE
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AKA (from which the analogous corrections of the GSM ISA can be immediately
derived).
The AKA protocol can be protected against active attackers when it is
slightly modified by computing and adding a value f(IMSI , X) to the authenti-
cation data response, where f(.) is some function, which S is able to compute and
which satisfies some injectivity properties (e.g. f may be a hash function), and
X some value known to S. Therefore, the authentication data transfer between
H and S for U is changed to
S −→ H : IMSI ,SNid
H −→ S : f(IMSI , X),RAND ,AUTN ,XRES ,Skey
We assume here that there is encryption and message authentication on all mes-
sages exchanged between S and H. For instance one could choose f(IMSI , X) ≡
IMSI .
As an alternative fix, S could generate a fresh request identifier, e.g. a nonce
nS and include it in the authentication data request for U . The correspond-
ing response must then include a function g (computable by S and with some
injectivity properties) over this nonce and some other data X known to S. In
that case, the authentication data transfer should be modified to the challenge-
response exchange
S −→ H : nS , IMSI ,SNid
H −→ S : g(nS , X),RAND ,AUTN ,XRES ,Skey ,
where nS is a fresh nonce. For instance, g could be the identity on nonces. Again,
we assume that there is encryption and message authentication on all messages
exchanged between S and H.
3.5 Feasibility of Real-World Attacks under IPsec or MAPsec
Our attacks against the specifications of UMTS and LTE AKA work even if mes-
sages between S and H are encrypted as well as integrity protected by a message
authentication code, which is what IPsec and MAPsec are doing. Although the
UMTS and LTE AKA protocols are flawed, there are various scenarios in which
real-world implementations of UMTS/LTE AKA could be immune to our at-
tacks.
IPsec protects the TCP layer data. This alone does not prevent the attacks
above (because IPsec would typically use the same session key for authentication
data requests for both U and U ′). But if, in addition to using IPsec, S uses
different ports to send its requests to H, then the port numbers are appended
to the sender/receiver addresses and become part of the protected TCP data.
Therefore, they could be used by S to assign the responses by H correctly to
each user. However, the specifications for UMTS and LTE do not detail how
concurrent IPsec sessions are managed. We note that the AKA protocol is also
likely run on top IPsec and other protocols, e.g. the diameter protocol [15]. If such
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protocols handle sessions properly and the used session identifier are protected
by IPsec, then the session-mixup attack is fended off.
Likewise, MAPsec can also be used in combination with a certain way of
managing sessions that prevents our attacks. In [2], which is the implementation
(stage-3) specification for MAP, the use of an invoke ID is mentioned that is
part of the authentication data request and the corresponding response and
needs to be unique for each serving network. If a serving network S uses a
separate invoke ID for each request, then S could assign each response correctly
to the corresponding request and our attacks would no work. But again, the
specifications are not detailed enough on how the invoke id is used in concurrent
sessions, and using the same invoke ID for several sessions is not ruled out.
Whether actual implementations of UMTS/LTE AKA follow the strategy
of combining IPsec or MAPsec with using unique ports, invoke IDs or session
IDs for concurrent authentication data requests is unknown to us. While this
seems to be a very natural way to implement session handling with IPsec and
MAPsec, it does not seem to be required by the specifications, and therefore
some implementations of UMTS/LTE AKA may indeed be vulnerable in the
real-world.
We question whether it is prudent practice to make the security of the
UMTS/LTE AKA protocol implicitly reliant on a specific way how IPsec or
MAPsec should be implemented, especially without stating it explicitly. Instead
we believe that it would be preferable to strengthen the AKA protocols directly
by making the binding of H’s authentication data response for an intended U
explicit in the protocol specifications. Notice also that, for intra-domain connec-
tions (and in the GSM case), operators can implement their proprietary solu-
tions instead of using IPsec or MAPsec. Therefore, such systems may currently
be vulnerable to our session mix-up attack as well, even if the implementations
were guided by [3, 7]. So correcting the UMTS/ LTE AKA protocol directly will
also better assist operators who wish to employ secure proprietary solutions for
intra-domain connections.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
We present a security analysis of the UMTS and LTE AKA, in which we used
the tool CryptoVerif to uncover a flaw in the specifications of UMTS and LTE
AKA (and GSM SIA) with rather serious consequences. An inside attacker can
authenticate as another honest subscriber to a serving network, and use the
wireless services on his behalf. We suggest corrections to the protocols and, in
ongoing work, we use the tool CryptoVerif to verify entity authentication and
key secrecy properties for the corrected UMTS and LTE AKA protocols.
We believe that, even if real-world implementations of UMTS and LTE AKA
that use IPsec or MAPsec happen to be immune against our attack, the un-
covered flaw provides a valuable lesson to network domain operators who would
like to protect their core networks’ communication with proprietary solutions
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(e.g., in the case of GSM, or for IP-based intra-domain connections in the case
of UMTS and LTE).
For future work, we are interested in exploring, ideally in cooperation with
3GPP and mobile network operators, to what extend real-world systems are
vulnerable to our attack. We would also like to expand our analysis scenarios
of the protocol execution that are not covered in the present work, e.g. the
scenarios that are related to the use of TMSIs and sequence numbers. Moreover,
it would be interesting to obtain not only asymptotic security guarantees but
also exact security guarantees with respect to the (fixed) key lengths used in the
specifications of UMTS and LTE AKA.
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